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Foreword
Rex E. Lee*
It is appropriate that this groundbreaking issue of the BYU journal of Public Law should deal with a subject that is both doctrinally
profound and also of great practical importance. Recent decades have
seen significant increases in land use planning efforts by governments
at all levels. Necessarily, these efforts have resulted in the diminution-and in many cases the virtual elimination-of property values.
Does the Constitution provide any protection against such exercises of
governmental power? Under what circumstances may land use regulation amount to a "taking," for which the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution require just compensation to be paid?
The cornerstone of our modern regulatory takings jurisprudence is
the Supreme Court's 1922 decision in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon/
authored by Justice Holmes. To many people of that day, Holmes' authorship of the Pennsylvania Coal opinion must have come as something of a surprise. It was the same Justice Holmes who, having witnessed the "grasping and predatory industrialism" 2 of his day,
frequently advocated construing the fourteenth amendment narrowly
and the state police power broadly. In fact, some thought that his judicial opinions gave legislatures a virtual free rein to regulate economic
growth and development. 8
Pennsylvania Coal involved a Pennsylvania law, the Kohler Act,
which prevented coal companies from mining coal in certain areas. The
law was designed to prevent surface subsidence and its accompanying
problems and appeared to be the kind of reasonable exercise of the
police power that in Justice Holmes' view would fall safely within the
legislative power. Nonetheless, seven other Justices joined with Justice
*Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University; Partner, Sidley
& Austin, Washington D.C.; J.D. 1963, University of Chicago; Solicitor General of the United
States 1981-1985. The author was counsel of record for the property owners in the recent Supreme Court regulatory takings case Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 55
U.S.L.W. 4326 (U.S. March 9, 1987) (No. 85-1092). The decision is discussed in this Foreword.
1. 260 u.s. 393 (1922).
2. M. LERNER, THE MIND AND FAITH OF JusTICE HoLMES xxvii (1943). In speeches to
law students during the later years of his life Justice Holmes revealed that he was "saddened at
the sordid commercialism he saw, both among industrialists and among lawyers." /d.
3. !d. at 185.
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Holmes in holding that the statute, by failing to provide compensation
to coal companies for the coal they were forced to leave under the
ground, violated the fifth amendment of the Constitution. "We are in
danger of forgetting", Justice Holmes wrote, "that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving
the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the
change." 4
Times have changed greatly since 1922. Many more people populate the United States, making our nation's land an even more precious
commodity. During the past 65 years great quantities of natural resources have been consumed or manufactured into other products. The
extraction and use of these resources have been the source of significant
air, water and land degradation, some of it possibly irreversible.
Thus, the issue the Supreme Court faced when it decided Pennsylvania Coal in 1922 is more sharply defined today, largely because of
increasing societal concern about the way we use and abuse our natural
resources. To what extent may government impose limits on the use of
privately owned land before it can be said that private property has
been "taken" for public use, requiring "just compensation" ?5 This issue has surfaced repeatedly in the Court in recent years, though we
have not yet progressed much beyond the ambiguous Pennsylvania
Coal rule that if governmental regulation "goes too far" a taking may
occur. 8
Most recently, in what many observers thought would be a replay
of Pennsylvania Coal, a Supreme Court majority of five held that
Pennsylvania's Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation
Act (the "Subsidence Act"), which requires 50% of the coal beneath
certain protected structures to be kept in place, was not a per se taking
of private property. 7 Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 8
4. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416.
5. This debate has existed since the early days of our nation. It was no secret that the Federalists wanted to secure the right of private property ownership from democratic incursions. R.
SCHLATfER, PRIVATE PROPERTY 190 (1951). Opponents of the Federalist view, on the other
hand, held that "the prerogatives of property were as fit to be abridged as those of princes." /d. at
192. Out of this conflict emerged the fifth amendment "which became the chief legal barrier to
popular demands for the limitation of private ownership." /d. at 194. Interestingly enough, it was
the anti-federalists who insisted on the amendment. They saw the amendment as "an explicit
guarantee of the rights of nature", i.e., an assurance that property ownership was not reserved for
a favored few. /d. at 193.
6. Justice Holmes wrote: "The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Pennsylvania Coal,
260 U.S. at 189.
7. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 55 U.S.L.W. 4326 (U.S. Mar. 9, 1987)
(No. 85-1092). The majority consisted of Justice Stevens, who wrote the opinion, and Justices
Brennan, Marshall, White and Blackmun.
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the modern day counterpart of Pennsylvania Coal, distinguished, 9 but
did not overrule, Justice Holmes' 65 year old opinion. Keystone's major
thrust may well be that times really have changed. 10 Justice Stevens,
writing for the majority, compared Keystone with Pennsylvania Coal,
focusing on what he regarded as differences between the legislative purposes underlying the two Pennsylvania subsidence statutes involved in
the respective cases. The Kohler Act, he noted, was enacted to prevent
damage to "some private landowners' homes." 11 The Subsidence Act,
on the other hand, was enacted "to protect the public interest in health,
the environment, and the fiscal integrity of the area." 12 Thus, the majority implied that the effects of subsidence in Pennsylvania today are
more acute than they were in 1922, justifying an extension of the police
power. Such an implication is strengthened by the fact that the stated
purposes of the Kohler Act and the Subsidence Act are virtually the
same. 13
After recognizing the public interests at stake, the majority later
explicitly held that the subsidence in Pennsylvania was akin to a public
nuisance and that police power restrictions were therefore justified. 14
This was a bold step, which, as the dissent noted "suggests an exception far wider than recognized in ... previous cases." 111 While the central purposes of the Subsidence Act included public safety concerns (the
traditional concerns of the police power), the Act reflected economic
concerns as well. Chief Justice Rehnquist voiced disagreement with allowing "a regulation based on essentially economic concerns to be insu8. ld.
9. /d. at 4329. The majority divided Justice Holmes' opinion into two parts: 1) the decision
of the case at hand, i.e., the injury to the Mahons' specific property; and 2) the portion of the
opinion discussing the general validity of the Kohler Act. The Keystone majority called the second
portion of Justice Holmes opinion "uncharacteristically. . . advisory . . . . " ld. at 4330. This
characterization might appear odd to Justice Holmes who wrote to his close friend, Frederick
Pollock, in November of 1922 that he believed the Pennsylvania Coal decision "to be a compact
statement of the real facts of the law and as such sure to rouse opposition for want of the customary soft phrases." Letter from Justice Holmes to Frederick Pollock (November 26, 1922) quoted
in LERNER, supra note 2, at 185.
10. The majority specifically stated that the Subsidence Act was "a prime example that 'circumstances may so change in time . . . as to clothe with such a [public] interest what at other
times. . . would be a matter of purely private concern.'" Keystone, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4331 (citing
with approval Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921)).
II. Keystone, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4331.
12. ld.
13. For a comparison of the two statutes see this issue, Berger, The Year of the Taking Issue,
I BYU J. Pus. L., 261, 287 (1987).
14. Keystone, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4331.
15. /d. at 4337 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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lated from the dictates of the Fifth Amendment by labeling it nuisance
regulation. " 16
By its terms, the fifth and fourteenth amendments' takings guarantee could be construed as applying only to exercises of the eminent domain power. Under this view, the constitutional guarantee would come
into play only in those circumstances where governmental action has
not only diminished the individual's net worth, but has also enriched
the government or someone designated by the government. However, it
has been clear since at least as early as 1922 when Pennsylvania Coal
v. Mahon was decided that the takings clause is not so limited; there
are some circumstances under which governmental exercise of its regulatory authority may amount to a taking for which the Constitution
requires that compensation be paid. 17 Keystone does not disturb that
basic ruling. Neither, however, does it do much to clarify the law. Controversy will continue over the kinds of governmental regulation that go
"too far" and which therefore amount to effective takings. 18 Accordingly, the importance of the issue with which this volume deals seems
assured for at least the immediate future.

16. Id. at 4338.
17. The Supreme Court recently affirmed that so-called "temporary regulatory takings" fit
within this category. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale vs. County of Los
Angeles, California, 85-1199 Slip Op. (U.S. Supreme Court June 9, 1987). For a detailed discussion of the Lutheran Church see this issue Berger, The Year of the Taking Issue, BYU J. Pub. L.
261-303 (1987).
18. Following the recent Supreme Court decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n.,
86-133 (U.S. June 26, 1987), controversy is likely to increase regarding the proper standard of
review of the ends-means relationship between the purposes of land-use regulations and the means
applied in holding that a condition placed upon a development permit was an improper use of the
police power, the court stated that "the evident constitutional property (of conditions placed upon
building permits) disappears, . . . if the condition substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to
further the end advanced as the justification as the prohibition." ld. For a discussion of the Nollan
case see this issue, Berger, The Year of the Taking Issue, 1 BYU J. Pub. L. 261, 315 (1987).

